Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-\u3ci\u3eMabo\u3c/i\u3e Era by Tehan, Maureen
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 7 
Number 3 Symposium: Emerging Land Use Law 
in the Pacific Rim 
7-1-1998 
Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in 
Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era 
Maureen Tehan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Cultural Heritage Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maureen Tehan, Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging Patterns 
of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 765 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol7/iss3/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright C 1998 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association
CUSTOMARY TITLE, HERITAGE PROTECTION, AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA: EMERGING
PATTERNS OF LAND USE IN THE POST-MABO ERA
Maureen Tehan
t
Abstract: The Mabo decision represented a major doctrinal change in the
relationship between Indigenous people and the settler legal system. However,
significant legislative developments in land use and management recognizing some
Indigenous interests in land had already laid the groundwork for joint land management
schemes and concurrent land uses. These developments have formed the basis for
ongoing expansion of coexistent land uses with the negotiation of formal and informal
agreements for co-management of land. A range of factors influence these agreements,
including the existence of enforceable property rights and non-property based heritage
protection legislation. These regimes are currently in a state of flux. In an uncertain
political environment there are possibilities for further recognition of Indigenous
involvement in land management. There are also real possibilities for contraction of the
limited rights of Indigenous people over land. Either development will impact the
significant involvement of Indigenous people in resource and environmental
management.
I. INTRODUCTION
While there are vastly different legal regimes across the Pacific Rim,
land use and management is characterized by a number of recurring themes
including the need to reconcile different relationships with land and to
reconcile conflicting aspirations between development and preservation of
both Indigenous cultural heritage and Indigenous land use systems. Many
different methods of regulating Indigenous heritage and land interests have
been devised, including systems that protect private property interests,
provide compensation for infringement of interests, or involve registration of
interests as a form of managing and controlling them. Within the Australian
context, many of these issues have been played out in the search by
Indigenous people for common law and statutory recognition of their
relationships to, and interests in, land by the settler legal system. The
contemporary common law recognition of native title, that is, pre-existing
aboriginal land interests, has brought the search for cognizable land rights
into sharp focus.
t BA, LLM, Melbourne, LLB with Honours, Monash, Lecturer, Law Faculty, University of
Melbourne.
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The pre-European system of land use and "ownership" in Australia
underwent a cataclysmic change in 1788 when Britain extended sovereignty
control over the continent.' This was the starting point of conflict between
dramatically and fundamentally different expressions of relationships with
land. The differences existed in many dimensions, including the institutional
and cultural underpinnings of the relationships, the knowledge systems
through which meaning and identity are ascribed, and the processes by which
the relationships are known and enforced. Unraveling the immense
differences has been a 210 year journey characterized by conflict and
subjugation 'of Indigenous interests to those of the colonizer, but also,
surprisingly, by coexistence. This journey continues and each of these
elements remains a feature of the contemporary patterns of land use, both in
the granting of interests in land by settler governments and the recognition
and protection of Indigenous interests, whether by recognition of forms of
ownership or statutory protection of Indigenous cultural heritage.
Until the landmark decision in Mabo v. Queensland,2 Australian
courts did not recognize Indigenous people's common law rights and interests
in land; furthermore, the Australian settler experience had entailed limited
statutory recognition of land based interests through Indigenous heritage
legislation and land grant schemes. For 200 years, land policies on the
Australian continent were characterized by dispossession of Indigenous
people.3 This process has been a result of colonial governments and, more
recently, State governments, either through legislation or executive acts,
exercising their power to grant interests in land for a variety of purposes,
including grants of estates in fee simple or "ownership rights," grants of
mining exploration rights to private individuals, and the creation of reserves
The validity of the acquisition of sovereignty was not challenged in Mabo v. Queensland (1992)
175 C.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Mabo II]. It is not accepted by all Indigenous people and has been the subject of
two unsuccessful challenges: Coe v. The Commonwealth (1979) 24 A.L.R 118 and Post-Mabo M1, Coe v.
The Commonwealth (1993) 118 A.L.R. 193.
2 See Mabo 11.
3 Id. at 68, per Brennan 1:
As the Governments of the Australian Colonies and, latterly, the Governments of the
Commonwealth, States and Territories have alienated or appropriated to their own purposes
most of the land in this country during the last 200 years, the Australian Aboriginal people
have been substantially dispossessed of their traditional lands. They were dispossessed by the
Crown's exercise of its sovereign powers to grant land to whom it chose or to appropriate to
itself the beneficial ownership of parcels of land for the Crown's purposes.
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for the conservation of bio-diversity or other purposes. This was done with
disregard of, or indifference to, Indigenous land interests.4
Two recent High Court decisions, Mabo JJ5 and Wik Peoples v.
Queensland,6 dealt with the issue of "native title," that is, Indigenous
interests in, and relationships with, land that survived British colonization.7
By recognizing a limited form of native title, the Mabo H1 Court confirmed
that certain pre-existing Indigenous rights and interests in land not only
survived Britain's initial settlement, but also survived subsequent legislative
and executive actions and have endured to the present. Mabo II not only
raised the possibility of the recognition of some Indigenous rights and
interests in land, previously unknown to the law, but questioned the validity
and extent of rights and interests previously granted in land over which some
form of native title could be claimed. In response to this new uncertainty, the
Commonwealth Parliament passed the Native Title Act in 1993 to define the
extent of aboriginal land rights based on native title.8 The Act validated past
legislative and executive acts while prescribing a method for valid future
dealings with land in which native title existed. Following the Wik decision,
substantial amendments to the Native Title Act were proposed.9
The fundamental elements of Indigenous people's relationships to land,
however characterized, are central to the concept of native title and thus its
recognition provides implicit protection of Indigenous cultural heritage which
is on native title land. However, where native title cannot be established, the
issue of recognition and protection of Indigenous heritage remains tenuous
and uncertain. This Article examines the emergence and direction of these
two different regimes for the recognition and protection of Indigenous
4 The extent of the dispossession has varied among Indigenous groups and geographical locations.
Partial or complete physical absence from land has not necessarily resulted in a loss of knowledge or the
economic, religious and cosmological connection that people have with their land. However this process
of dispossession has contemporary relevance because of the characterization of native title both judicially
and legislatively.
' Mabo II.
6 Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 [hereinafter Wik].
' The Full Bench of the Court has decided two other native title cases since 1992. The first,
Western Australia v. The Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373, dealt largely with the validity of the
Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.) and the conflicting Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act, 1993 (W.
Anstl.), the extent of Commonwealth powers and the application of the Racial Discrimination Act, 1975
(Aust.) to dealings with native title. The second, North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v. Queensland
(1996) 135 A.L.R. 227, dealt largely with procedural issues arising under § 63 of the Native Title Act,
1993 (Austl.) and the regulations made under the Act.
8 See Tim Rowse, How We Got A Native Title Act, 65 AUSRAUAN QUARTERLY 111 (1993) for an
insightful analysis of both the public debate and the negotiations which produced the legislation in its final form.
9 The Native Title Amendment Bill, 1997 was finally introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament on
September 4, 1997. The Act was passed in July 1998 and came into effect on September 30, 1998.
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relationships with land. It is suggested that while the parameters of native
title are uncertain, it has provided a legal basis for the renegotiation of land
interests between the settler society and Indigenous people. On the other
hand, it is suggested that systems for the protection of Indigenous heritage
outside of native title provide little protection and are diminishing in their
capacity to protect Indigenous land based interests.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Australia's political and constitutional history has directly impacted the
development of Indigenous/settler relations and land laws. The original
colonization of the east coast of Australia occurred on 26 January 1788.
Sovereignty over other parts of what is now known as Australia was claimed
at various times after that date. For example, sovereignty of what is now the
State of Western Australia was not claimed until approximately 1829,10 and
sovereignty of the Island of Mer, the subject of the Mabo H case, was not
claimed until 1879.11 At various times during the nineteenth century, existing
Australian colonies were divided to create new ones.' 2 During that period,
the powers of colonial legislatures were determined by their relationship with
the British Crown and the powers that the Crown delegated. These delegated
powers ultimately included the power to grant interests in land in accordance
with the colony's constitution, 13 and each colony established its own system
of land titles registration. 14 In the course of exercising their powers over
land, the Colonies acquired ownership of the sub-surface and minerals and
established systems for the regulation of the exploration and extraction of
minerals and other resources.' 5
Colony land management included grants of fee simple freehold land
and a range of licenses and (so called) leases in more remote and marginal
areas. This latter system was designed to impose some order and government
control on an anarchic grab for land known as "squatting." The granting of
'0 N. OGLE, THE COLONY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA: A MANUAL FOR EMIGRANTS (1839).
" SeeMabo11, (1992) 175 CL.R. 1, at 19.
12 For example, the colony of Queensland was carved out of the colony of New South Wales in 1859.
13 The nature and extent of these powers have themselves been subject of considerable debate. See
ALEX C CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY (1982). The legal and constitutional relationships
between colonies and the Crown has renewed significance in the contemporary native title d bate. See
Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129.
14 Each colony established its own Torrens system of land registration.
's Throughout the late nineteenth century, colonies passed legislation claiming ownership of most
minerals for themselves. This is a significant difference between the Australian, United States and
Canadian systems of sub-surface rights attaching to the fee simple.
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freehold fee simple title was considered inappropriate in such areas and so the
institution known as pastoral leases was born. 16 The capacity of the colonies
to make grants was limited by their constitutions; in particular, the
Executive's power to make grants was limited by the authority granted by the
legislature.1 7  A huge number of different types of land tenures were
developed for various geographical and social situations'8 and covered
significant portions of the Australian land mass. Many of these tenures have
survived to the present day. 19
On 1 January 1901, the six colonies formed a Federation under the
Australian Constitution. Power to make laws in relation to a range of matters
was specifically given to the Commonwealth while the States retained
residuary powers.20 The States may legislate matters within the jurisdiction
of the Commonwealth, but the validity of that legislation is subject to any
inconsistent or overriding Commonwealth legislation.
21
The division of powers between different governments has produced a
complex web of statutory provisions governing not only Indigenous land
interests and heritage, but also resource and environmental management.
There is, as a result, a myriad of schemes for recognition, management and
protection of Indigenous interests in land and their coexistence with other
uses. There are four major factors supporting Commonwealth influence on
the schemes. First, the power of the Commonwealth to make laws in relation
to Indigenous people was confirmed by a 1967 referendum that changed
section 51(XXIV) of the Australian Constitution to empower the
Commonwealth to make special laws it "deemed necessary" for people of
particular races including "Aborigines." Second, the Commonwealth's power
has also been expanded as a result of a series of High Court decisions that
have confirmed Commonwealth legislative competence when exercised
16 See ANDREW LANG, CROWN LANDS IN NEW SOUTH WALES (1973) and Henry Reynolds & James
Dalziel, Aborigines and Pastoral Leases-Imperial and Colonial Policy 1826-1855, 19 U.N.S.W. L.J. 315
(1996), for a discussion of aspects of this history.
17 Cudgen Rutile (No. 2) Pty. Ltd. v. Chalk (1975) 4 A.L.R. 438. See also Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R.
129, at 224 per Gummow J. "The management and control of waste lands in Queensland was vested in the
legislature and any authority of the Crown in that respect had to be derived from statute." Id.
IS See Wik at 225 per Gummow J ("a bewildering multiplicity of tenures," quoting A.C. MILLARD &
G.W. ILLARD, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY IN NEW SouTH WALES (1930)).
19 It is the characterization of.these tenures and their relationship with native title, both its
continued enjoyment and its extinguishment, that lies at the heart of Wik.
20 AuST. CONST. § 51.
21 Id § 109. For a discussion of the development of the Australian Constitutional development see
PATRICK LANE, A MANUAL OF AUSTRAuAN CoNsTrrTiONAL LAW (1991).
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pursuant to International agreements and obligations.22 The power deriving
from international agreements has emerged as the crucial element for
protection of Indigenous interests through the application of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975, the municipal implementation of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.23
Third, while the schemes for creating conservation reserves or granting
licenses or leases for exploration and mining (resource tenements) remain
squarely within the legislative competence of the States, the Commonwealth
has been able to influence resource developments by refusing to exercise its
powers, for example, in granting export licenses, unless there has been
compliance with its own regime for environmental and resource
management. 24 Finally, the Commonwealth has direct power over Territories
which has been important because of the large Indigenous population and
geographical size of the Northern Territory.25
The consequence of this complex scheme has been an ongoing
negotiation and renegotiation of Commonwealth/State relations. In relation to
environmental management, there have been some moments of
Commonwealth activism, but successive Governments have tended to pursue
a process of cooperative federalism, creating policies and goals through
Ministerial meetings and negotiation. 26  The Commonwealth's capacity to
intervene in resource management has largely been confined to the use of its
27constitutional powers over such areas as the environment, Indigenous
heritage,2 8 or trade.29 The impact of the exercise of power has largely been on
the implementation of large scale developments and their form and scope.3 °
22 AUST. CONST. §51, cl. XXIX. See Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1; Koowarta
v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168.
23 See Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen; Mabo v. Queensland (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 [hereinafter Mabo
1]; Mabo H (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373.24 Murphyores Incorporated Pty. Ltd v. Commonwealth (1976) 136 C.L.R. 1.
2' AUST. CONST. § 122.
26 GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 76 (1995).
27 World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983 (Austl.); Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983)
158 C.L.R. 1.
22 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 (Ausfl.).
29 Murphyores 136 C.L.R. 1.
30 For example the refusal of the Commonwealth to issue export licenses meant that only three
uranium mines could operate in Australia This policy has recently been abandoned by the recently
elected Federal government. Similarly, the exercise of powers under both the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 (Austl.) and the Territories power enabled the Commonwealth to
prevent the development of a large mine at Coronation Hill in the Northern Territory. The High Court
recently held that the Commonwealth's action amounted to an acquisition of the resource developers'
property and that just compensation for the taking was required under § 51(XXXI) of the Australian
Constitution. Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v. Commonwealth (1997) 147 A.L.R. 42.
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Schemes for the granting and regulation of resource tenements have been left
to the States, with the Commonwealth only influencing the process by
imposing additional conditions prior to exercising its necessary authority, or
preventing the project from proceeding because of either environmental or
heritage considerations.
The final piece in the constitutional mosaic of land use law relates to
the Commonwealth's liability to pay compensation to landowners for the
compulsory acquisition of property. The Constitution specifically provides
that the Commonwealth may only acquire property on "just terms"'31 and thus
its power to affect property interests is fettered to some extent by the
requirement to pay compensation. The States have no similar constitutional
limitation on compulsory acquisition of land, but most States have legislation
that requires the payment of compensation for compulsory acquisitions of
land.32  These provisions have emerged as significant factors in the
developing pattern of land use regimes since the Mabo II decision.33 It is
against this legal and constitutional background that Indigenous land
relationships have sought recognition and protection.
III. INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND RELATIONSHIPS TO LAND
It is almost impossible to generalize Indigenous people's relationships
to land. At the time of colonization, there were over 500 different language
groups in Australia and although some of these were related and connected in
both language and cultural interchanges, many were quite distinct and
diverse.34 In the modem context, the extent of distinctions might be seen in a
simple comparison of the claims in the two major native title cases. In Mabo
lthe claim covered three small islands in the Torres Strait with a total area of
nine square kilometres. 35 This might be contrasted with the claim of the Wik
and Thayorre peoples in Wik, in which the claim covered a combined area of
1,754 square miles.36
Indigenous relationships with land are complex and various, revolving
around spatial, spiritual, and social organization deriving from, and given
meaning through, connections to particular land. They are the source of laws,
31 AUST. CONST. § 51, cl. XXXI.
32 See The Land Acquisition and Compensation Act, 1986 (Vict.).
33 Mabo11(1992) 175 C.L.R. I.
34 NORMAN TINDALE, ABORIGINAL TRIBES OF AUSTRAUA (1974).
31 Mabo H1, at 16.
36 Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129, 140. The diversity also provides a partial explanation for the many
disputes between Indigenous people about native title claims and the right to "speak for country."
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customs, and identity, and represent a complex of meanings which explain the
universe and provide a "kind of narrative of things that once happened; a kind
of charter of things that still happen; and a kind of logos or principle of order
transcending everything significant for Aboriginal man."37  Land and the
landscape, including specific features such as rocks, hills, river beds, trees,
and waterholes, as well as the plant and animal life associated with the land,
provide the central connecting element in this set of meanings.
38
The Indigenous relationship and connection to land may arise in a
variety of ways, such as biological succession through birth or adoption,
through association by conception or birth at a particular place, or through
territorial proximity. The nature of a person's association with land will
deternine the extent of their rights and duties and responsibilities in relation
to the land, including whether they are the major spokesperson for, or
whether they are entitled to, the fruits of the land.39 However, as indicated by
Stanner,4 ° these relationships include all aspects of peoples' lives, including
the material as well as the spiritual. 4' They comprise a central element of a
person's identity, giving them a place within the complex set of cultural
relationships to the people and the world around them.4 2
The nature of traditions associated with, and deriving from, land varies
from group to group. For example, in the Murray Islands, the relationships
consist of "specified plots of clearly bounded land handed down mainly by
patrilineal inheritance." '43 The source of the relationship derives from "sacred
endowment and religious certitude." 4  In contrast, western desert cultural
3' W.E.1. STANNER, WHITE MAN GOT NO DREAMING: ESSAYS 1938-1973, 24 (1979).
38 These meanings vary between groups. For a detailed discussion of very different Indigenous
groups and cultures see TINDALE, supra note 34; NONIE SHARP, STARS OF TOGAi: THE TORRES STRAIT
ISLANDERS (1993); FRED MYERS, PINTUPI COUNTRY PINTUPI SELF (1986).
9 Kenneth Maddock, "Owners," "Managers" and the Choice of Statutory Traditional Owners by
Anthropologists and Lawyers, in ABORIGINES, LAND AND LAND RIGHTS 211 (N. Peterson & M. Langton
eds., 1984); Peter Sutton, The Robustness ofAboriginal Land Tenure Systems: Underlying and Proximate
Customary Titles, 67 OCEANIA 7 (1996).
o STANNER, supra note 37.
41 See, e.g., MYERS, supra note 38; A.P. ELKIN, THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES (1964). In fact, this
distinction between the spiritual and economic has been criticized by a number of writers who see it as a
source of the problems in judicial treatment of Indigenous people's relationships with land. See Nonie
Sharp, No Ordinary Case: Reflections on Mabo No.2, in ESSAYS ON THE MABo DECISION 23, at 31-36
(Law Book Company ed., 1993) (criticizing Moynihan J in Mabo for his emphasis on the economic to the
exclusion of the spiritual); NANCY WILtAMS, THE YOLNGU AND THEIR LAND 202 (1986).
42 See MYERS, supra note 38.
43 NONIE SHARP, NO ORDINARY JUDGMENT 165 (1996).
SId. at 162.
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"knowledge ' 5 covers large areas (approximately half the continent) and
consists in part of particular places and in part of tracks which join places in a
network of tracks made by ancestral beings which cris-cross the desert.
Songs, stories, and rituals, known as the tjukurrpa, link many people across
this vast area of the desert in systems of stories constituting "a changing
political charter of who and what are identified at various levels.""
6 That is,
the hierarchy of decision-making and control stems from this complex
spiritual system. In a substantial part of the central and western deserts of the
Australian continent, land interests range across wide areas and, according to
Myers, cannot be limited to an identifiable and bounded parcel of land.
47
Rather, there is an interconnectedness between people across these vast areas
involving negotiation of ownership claims and social acknowledgment of
potential responsibility for the area, which may involve diverse duties such as
cleaning waterholes, "burning of country," performing ceremonies "directly
related to the land," for example retelling creation stories represented in land
formations and preserving animal and plant species, making and maintaining
of ceremonial artifacts, and other duties that affect the well-being of the group
and the individuals within it.
4 8
Land is the significant and central element in all aspects of the
Indigenous people's existence. Such a complex system makes differentiating
the elements of the relationship with land difficult and attempts to do so may
be inappropriate because it breaks up the coherent whole of culture and
existence. However, such a differentiation has occurred within the settler
legal system in a variety of ways, including in the formulation of heritage
legislation,49 the differentiation (in legislation) between movable heritage such
as archaeological artifacts and land based sites of significance, and regimes
for the protection of intellectual property. These regimes protect production
associated with the relationship between land and production, but not the
knowledge that underpins or is represented in that production. At a more
fundamental level, Sharp suggests that the attempt to differentiate between
elements of this cosmology, for example between the spiritual and the
economic, is at the root of the difficulty that the settler legal system has
45 The "western desert cultural bloc" covers those groups occupying a large part of the central and
western desert areas of the Australian continent and has been identified in anthropological literature as
groups having significant spiritual and land based relationships in common. Ronald Berndt, The Concept
of "The Tribe " in the Western Desert ofAustralia, 30 OCEANIA 81 (1959).
'6 MYERS, supra note 38, at 60.
Sld. at 73.
4I Id. at 95-102.
49 See notes 89-134 and accompanying text
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experienced in understanding and recognizing Indigenous people's
relationships with land.50
How then has the settler legal system, both legislatively and at common
law, recognized and protected these relationships to land?
IV. INDIGENOUS LAND INTERESTS PRE-MABO
A. Indigenous Interests at Common Law
Until the High Court's decision in Mabo 11, 51 there had been a widely
(but not universally)52 held view 53 that no Indigenous rights, customs, or law,
including any land interests, survived "the acquisition of sovereignty by the
British Crown." This view was based on a series of appellate cases that
confirmed that with sovereignty, the laws of England had become the laws of
the colony. These cases dealt with the power of the Crown to make grants of
interests in land to settlers and confirmed that in accordance with the doctrine
of tenure, the land was a Royal demesne and the Crown held beneficial title;
it was not possible for any interest in land to arise, be created or exist, other
than by way of a grant from the Crown.54 That principle was adopted in a
number of subsequent High Court cases also dealing with the relationship
between the Crown and settler interests or, later, between states and the
Commonwealth. 5 The decisions rested upon the terra nullius doctrine, a set
of common law principles deriving from International law. Under the
doctrine, a colony could be established on "uninhabited land"; land was
uninhabited if its occupants were nomadic and had no settled law. The view
was clearly enunciated by the Privy Council in Cooper v. Stuart.5 6
50 SHARP, supra note 43 at 103.
"! MaboI1(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
52 Richard Bartlett, Mabo: Another Triumph for the Common Law, 15 SYDNEY L. REv. 178 (1993);
Garth Nettheim, Judicial Revolution or Cautious Correction? Mabo v. Queensland, 16 U. NEw SOUTH
WALEsL.J. 1(1993).
3 Gabriel Moens, Mabo and Political Policy-making, in MABo: A JUDICIAL REvoLrroN 48, 50
(Margaret Stephenson, & Suri Ratnapalaeds eds., 1993); L.J.M Cooray, The High Court in Mabo: Legalist or
I 'egotiste, in MAKE A BETER OFFER: THE POLiTIcS OF MABO 65 (Murray Goot, & Tim Rowse eds., 1994).
" Cooper v. Stuart (1889) 14 App. CaE 286; Attorney-General v. Brown (1847) 1 Legge 317.
55 Williams v. Attorney-General (N.S.W.) (1913) 16 C.L.R. 404; New South Wales v.
Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337.
5 Cooper v. Stuart, at 291. The Privy Council said:
The extent to which English law is introduced into a British Colony and the manner of its
introduction must necessarily vary according to circumstances There is a great difference
between the case of a Colony acquired by conquest or cession, in which there is an established
system of law and that of a Colony which consisted of a tract of territory, practically
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None of these cases directly addressed whether Indigenous land interests
were entirely extinguished upon colonization, although the issue was considered
in the course of the decisions. The first case to raise such a claim was heard in
1971 by a single judge in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of
Australia.5 7 This case involved a claim by the Indigenous inhabitants of the Gove
Peninsula, the Yolgnu, for common law Aboriginal title based upon the argument
that their title had survived sovereignty. Although the judgment recognizes the
complexity of the relationship of land to the plaintiffs, the court felt bound by the
decision in Cooper v. Stuart. The claim that Indigenous interests survived the
"acquisition of sovereignty" was unsuccessful. 58  The issue of recognition and
protection was thus left to the legislatures.
B. Statutory Regulation of Indigenous Interests
1. Reserves and Land Rights Legislation
From the time of colonization, official colonial policies expressed various
levels of concern for the Indigenous population. Legislative benevolence was not
necessarily reflected in the practical interactions between Indigenous inhabitants
and settlers, which were marked by conflicting aspirations in relation to land.59
From the mid-nineteenth century and throughout this century, colonial and
state governments embarked on a process of creating reserves for the "use and
benefit of the aboriginal inhabitants," under general lands legislation.60 The
reserves were initially characterized by two dominant features. They provided
protection for Indigenous people from the impacts of colonial society and
enabled them to continue some elements of their own culture.
6'
unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time it was peacefully
annexed to the British dominions. The colony of New South Wales belongs to the latter
class.
5' Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971) 17 F.L.R 141.
58 Id.
59 For discussion of this early period of relations between Indigenous groups and settlers and
colonial policy see, HENRY REYNOLDS, FRONTIER (1987); MARC GUMBERT, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR REASON
(1984); CHARLES ROWLEY, THE DESTRUCTION OF ABORIGINAL SOCIETY (1970).
60 See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Sale of Waste Land Belonging to the Crown in the Australian
Colonies, 1842 (Imp); Land Act, 1898 (W. Austl.); Crown Lands Consolidation Act, 1877 (S. Austl.). Similar
legislation was passed in other colonies and most current land legislation still includes these provisions. The
equivalent Queensland legislation Crown Lands Alienation Act, 1876 (Queensl.) was one such piece of
legislation and was considered inMabo 11(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, at 71 per Brennan J.
61 HEATHER GOODALL, INVASION TO EMBASSY: LAND IN ABORIGINAL PoLrnCS IN NEW SOUTH
WALES, 1770-1972, Part 2 (1996).
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the reserves became tools for
colonial administrations to impose severe constraints on the lives of Indigenous
people. Groups were moved to reserves in locations often hundreds of miles
from their traditional lands. People were not permitted to leave the reservations
and the superintendent of the reserve had power over most aspects of people's
lives. What began as a protective measure became a means of cultural
destruction and massive dislocation, and continued well into the second half of
the twentieth century.62
Occasionally, the location of reservations coincided with the land interests
of the Indigenous groups,63 but for the most part, reservations were created
without reference to, or consideration of, Indigenous land interests and
relationships, and managed without the involvement of Indigenous people.
Reserves were mechanisms for control and "protection" of Indigenous people
either through government administration or Christian missions.
In the middle of the twentieth century the dominant policy changed from
one of protection to one of assimilation; reserves became a key factor in
implementing the policy. 6 4 The assimilation policy was based on the idea that
"in practical terms ... in the course of time, it is expected that all persons of
Aboriginal birth or mixed blood in Australia will live like white Australians
do."65 The policy rejected Indigenous culture and attempted to incorporate
Indigenous people into the dominant culture. The policy was most dramatically
marked by the removal of Aboriginal children from their families.66
Paradoxically, reserves have assumed a new significance in the native title
era. Because the lands were reserved for the benefit of Aboriginal people, it is
less likely that there has been any technical extinguishment as a result of some
inconsistent grant or use of the land, and in that sense it is more likely that native
title will have been preserved.67
Reserves, then, became a dominant feature of land management for
Indigenous people in the settler legal and land administration system. They were
rarely seen as beneficial by Indigenous people, at least during the twentieth
62 Id. at Parts 3 and 4; SURvIvAL IN OUR OWN LAND (Christabel Mattingley & Ken Hampton eds.,
1988). See Neal v. R (1982) 149 C.L.R 305 for a particularly cogent and contemporary discussion of the
operation of this system by Murphy J.
63 The Murray Islands are a clear example of this coincidence.
"A GOODALL, supra note 61.
65 GUMBERT, supra note 59, at 19.
66 C. EDWARDS & P. READ, THE LOST CHILDREN (1989); BRINGING THEM HOME: REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM
THEIR FAMILIES (1997). This factor now has significant consequences in relation to the need to establish
unbroken links with land in order to claim native title.
61 Mabo 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R 1, at 64 per Brennan J; Pareroultja v. Tickner (1993) 117 A.L.R 206.
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century, and were often seen as the source of cultural devastation and
disharmony. Conspicuously absent from this regime was the notion of land
management, much less ownership, by Indigenous people in terms commensurate
with, and comprehensible to, their systems of knowledge and culture.
The mid 1960s brought a change in government attitudes. Policy
refocused on the land needs of Indigenous people. The first example of this
change was the establishment of Aboriginal Land Trusts in South Australia6" and
Westem Australia.69 These efforts did not focus on land relationships, but did
acknowledge that the Indigenous inhabitants of reserves had some land needs.
Management of the reserves was given to Indigenous people, but was at a State
rather than local reserve level.
Activities on reserves by non-Indigenous interests usually required some
element of special consent by the body with responsibility for management of the
reserve. The most common activity was mining exploration and development.
Such activity was not subject to consent or even advice from the Indigenous
inhabitants of reserves. Most jurisdictions established administrative regimes for
the processing of applications70 and there were often arrangements made for
special payments, including royalties, from the activity. These payments would
most often become part of consolidated revenue and rarely, if ever, were the
funds used on the reserve.7'
From the mid 1960s there were parallel developments that began to focus
specifically on Indigenous people's relationships with land and their cultural
priorities. A major change occurred with the Australian Land Rights
Commission Report72 and the resultant Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 (Cth.). The crucial aspect of the report and the legislation
was that it provided for land ownership in the form of an inalienable fee simple
grant, held by a group having some traditional connection with the land. In
addition, there was a regime under which the land owners could regulate activity,
particularly mining, on the land. Several states subsequently adopted Land
Rights Acts implementing similar models.73
6 Aboriginal Lands Trust Act, 1966 (S. Austl.).
69 Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act, 1972 (W. Austl.).
70 See Maureen Tehan, Practising Land Rights: The Pitjantatara in the Northern Territory, South
Australia and Western Australia, 65 AUSTRALIAN Q. 34 (1994) for a consideration of these administrative
arrangements in Western Australia.
71 Id.
72 E. WOODWARD, ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS COMMISSION: FIRST REPORT (1973); E. WOODWARD
ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS COMMISSION: SECOND REPORT (1973). Woodward had been senior counsel for
the plaintiffs in Milirrpum (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141.
73 Other legislation modeled on the Woodward Report included The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act,
1981 (S. Austl.) and the Maralinga-Tjarutja Land Rights Act, 1984 (S. Austl.). Other states also passed
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The method of recognizing the relationship between Indigenous land
interests and the Anglo-Australian system of land tenure was through a statutory
definition seeking to adequately describe the key elements of the relationship and
identify "owners," those people with some connection to the land, the features of
its landscape, and its resources.]
4
This model has been criticized because it has difficulty reflecting a range
of disparate Indigenous cultures. Maddock argued,75 for example, that the
definition of "traditional Aboriginal owner" in section 4 of the Act has had the
effect of excluding certain groups of Aboriginal people who might be said to
have interests in land. Similarly, "local descent group" has been interpreted in
some land claims as individuals who are "totemically connected in the male line
to a site on the land being claimed., 76 In turn, the definition and its interpretation
has resulted in groups with connections to the land akin to that of "managers"
being excluded from the benefits such as royalty payments under the Act, with
these benefits confined to those identified as "owners." Attempts were made to
broaden this approach by arguing that descent groups were ambilinea 77 (being
both from the male and female line) and cognatic (including both owners and
managers).78
Thus, even a statutory scheme that recognizes Indigenous land
"ownership" is often incongruous with the traditional laws and customs it seeks
to recognize and protect.79 A key challenge for the future is the extent to which a
legislative definition of "ownership," and its judicial interpretation, will
legislation: Aboriginal Land Rights Act, 1983 (NS.W.), Aboriginal Land Act, 1991 (Queensl.); and
Torres Strait Islander Land Act, 1991 (Queensi.). Under each of these statutes, old reserves were
converted into grants of freehold title under the relevant legislation. In both New South Wales and
Queensland, grants of land are not confined to traditional association but could be based on residence or
historical association.
74 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976, § 3 (Austl.): "traditional aboriginal
owner" means a local descent group of Aboriginals who- (a) have common spiritual affiliations to a site
on the land, being affiliations that place the group under primary spiritual responsibility for that site and
for the land; and (b) are entitled by Aboriginal tradition to forage as of right over that land. A more
general definition of traditional Aboriginal owner can be found in § 4 of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights
Act, 1981 (S. Austl.): "an Aboriginal person who has, in accordance with Aboriginal tradition social,
economic and spiritual affiliations with and responsibilities for the lands or any part of them," but this
definition has not been the subject of judicial comment or significant anthropological work.
75 Maddock, supra note 39, at 211.
76 Id at 212.
7R Layton, Ambilineal Descent and Traditional Pitantjatjara Rights to Land, in ABORIGINES,
LAND AND LAND RiGHTS, supra note 39, at 14.
78 Maddock, supra note 39, at 217. Even in the earlier literature, there was no agreement on the
meaning and significance of terms such as "local descent group" and its role in ownership. These matters
took on greater significance with the need to provide meaning to such words in a judicial context
'9 Id. at218.
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encompass the laws and customs of the Aboriginal group.8° The seeming freeing
up of the concept of land ownership under the native title jurisprudence and
legislation suggests that a more appropriate method of determining the
interconnections between Indigenous land relationships and the dominant legal
system might emerge.
8'
The statutory schemes include provisions for the regulation of resource
development and other uses on granted land. Each establishes a detailed regime
for the consideration of applications by developers, allowing for a veto of such
proposals by Indigenous landowners, subject only to Commonwealth ministerial
override in the case of the Northem Territory legislation and arbitration under the
Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act. 2  There is no prescription as to the nature of
negotiations that might occur or the outcomes of those negotiations, although the
practice has been to negotiate agreements that include such matters as access for
exploration and development, heritage and environmental protection,
employment, education and business opportunities for the Indigenous land
owners, as well as payments of compensation for disruption.
83
Environmental management has also been a feature of these land
regimes. Partly spurred by some international developments8 4 and partly
by Indigenous people's aspirations for control and management of their
lands, a range of schemes for joint management of conservation areas
were developed. The two most well known of these, for Uluru Kata-Tjuta
National Park and Kakadu National Park, establish co-management
regimes over land granted to Indigenous land owners under the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth.). The major joint
management tool in both circumstances is a board of management with a
majority of Indigenous land owners. There are similar arrangements in
relation to national parks and conservation reserves in other jurisdictions, entered
8o G. Neate, Looking After Country: Legal Recognition of Traditional Rights to and
Responsibilities for Land, 16 U. NEW S. WALEs L.J. 161, at 187-195 (1993); see also R. v. Toohey: Ex
parte Mending Station Pty. Ltd. (1982) 158 C.L.R. 327 at 357 per Brennan J.
81 At this stage there is insufficient jurispnidence on the subject to determine the direction of this issue.
82 See Tehan, supra note 70, for a discussion of the regimes under these two statutory schemes as
well as the regime governing resource development in reserves in Western Australia prior to the native
title decision and legislation.
83 There are provisions in both Acts for payment of some form of statutory royalties although the
detail of agreements is unavailable because of confidentiality provisions.
84 For example, the Rio DECLARAXON ON ENvmRONmEN AND DEVELoP ENT, AGENDA 21 and THE
CONvENnON ON Tim CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DvERsrrY both refer to the role of Indigenous people in
land and environmental management In the Australian context, see B. Richardson et al., Indigenous Peoples
and Environmental Management: A Review of Canadian Regional Agreements and Their Potential Application
to Australia-Parts I and 2, 11 ENvtomm rAND P,ANmNG LAW JOuRNAL 320 (1994).
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into under some form of land rights or environmental legislation.8 5 There are also
schemes for participation of Indigenous people in environmental management
outside of conservation reserves and formal joint management arrangement
through ranger programmes and resource management.8 6 While all these
programmes have deficiencies and have yet to come to grips with conflicting
knowledge systems and management paradigms, 87 they provide some models
and starting points for renegotiating the relationship between Indigenous people
and environmental managers in the dominant settler system.
2. Heritage Legislation
Legislative regimes for the protection of land based cultural heritage are of
recent origin. 88  Acts relating to preservation of relics or archaeological finds
were passed generally in the 1960s89 and early 1970s 9° and the Aboriginal
Heritage Act 1972 (Western Australia) became the first legislation protecting
land-based cultural heritage. 91 Twelve years later, the Commonwealth passed its
own legislation, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act
1984 (Commonwealth).
Early heritage legislation reveals a concem to preserve cultural artifacts as
an aspect of Australia's pre-history and as objects suitable for study, rather than
as protection of the living and contemporary cultural heritage of Indigenous
people. For example, the name of the Victorian legislation, Archaeological and
Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act, indicates its focus. The Act provided for
protection of relics, defined as "a relic pertaining to the past occupation of the
85 For example, arrangements in Witjira National Park under the National Parks and Wildlife Act,
1972 (S. Austl.). There is provision for land grants and joint management under the Aboriginal Land
Act, 1991 (Queensl.) and similar legislation in New South Wales.
86 These include participation in programmes for protection of heritage sites, training and
employment as rangers in reserves or as guides in tourist or cultural activities, restoration and protection
of rock art sites, as well as in research programmes. See ABORIGINAL INVOLVEMENT IN PARKS AND
PROTECTED AREAS 223, 241, 265, 271, 312, 319 (J. Birckhead et al., eds., 1993).
8' L Strelein, Indigenous People and Protected Landscapes in Western Australia, 10 ENVIRONMENTAL
AND PLANNING LAW JouRNAL 380 at 382 (1993); Maureen Tehan, Indigenous Peoples, Access to Land and
NegotiatedAgreements, 14 ENVIRONMENTAL ANDPLANNINGLAW JOURNAL 114, 119-21 (1997).
88 In addition to tangible heritage such as burial sites and arti cts, the term "land based cultural heritage"
is used in Australia and in this artIce to describe aspects of Indigenous culture, deriving from traditions, customs,
and lore that have physical manifestations in land such as trees, rivers, and rock formations. These physical
manifestations have a spiritual place in contemporary Indigenous cultural practices.
89 Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act, 1965 (S. Austl.); The Aboriginal Relics
Preservation Act, 1967 (Queensl.).
90 Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act, 1972 (Vict.).
91 Other states and territories passed similar legislation at various stages. See, e.g., Native and
Historical Objects and Areas Preservation Ordinance, 1976 (N. Terr.).
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Aboriginal people of Victoria and includes any Aboriginal deposit, carving,
drawing, skeletal remains . ... "92 The Act confirmed Crown ownership of
relics and delegated to the Director of the State Museum responsibility for
protecting relics. The Act established an Archaeological Advisory Committee of
ten, of which only one was to be an Indigenous person. This provision was later
amended to increase the number of Indigenous members to three. 93 While the
Act requires strict compliance with its provisions,94 its focus is indicative of the
general approach to Indigenous heritage since colonization-a preoccupation
with heritage as an object of curiosity or study.95 This Act remains the current
law in Victoria.96
Legislation introduced in the 1970s began to recognize land based cultural
heritage in addition to cultural objects. The Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (W.
Ausfl.) is a useful example. In many respects, it differed little from the Victorian
regime in its definitions,97 method of protection through declarations and control
of objects by the State Museum,98 offences for interference, 99 the role of the
Museum, °00 and the absence of an Indigenous voice in heritage protection.
However, the Act provided protection for "Aboriginal sites," which were not
confined to archaeological sites as in the Victorian Act, but included "any place,
including any sacred, ritual or ceremonial site, which is of importance or special
significance to persons of Aboriginal descent."' 0'1 The Act not only was
expressed in the present tense, indicating the contemporary significance of land
to Indigenous people, but its language also acknowledged that Indigenous
relationships to land could lead to statutory protection of specific sites.
102
The Act provided protection through declarations 0 3 in relation to specific
areas with a system of fencing off areas and displaying notices detailing the status
92 Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act, 1972, § 2 (Vict.).
93 Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1980. (Vict.).
94 Berg v. Council of the Museum of Victoria and Others (1984) V.R. 613.
9s Id.; Mark Harris, Scientific & Cultural Vandalism, 21 ALTERNATIVE L. BuLL 28 (1996).
96 Attempts to amend the Victorian legislation in 1986 failed to pass through the upper house of
Parliament. Consequently, at the request of the Victorian Government, the Commonwealth inserted Part
llA-Victorian Aboriginal Cultural Heritage-into the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage
Protection Act, 1984 (Austl.) which established a special regime for heritage protection within Victoria.
The Act is being reviewed but is yet to be substantially amended.
' Aboriginal Heritage Act, § 4, 1972 (W. AustI.).
98 Id. §40.
99 Id. §§ 17, 43.
00) Id. §§ 28-39.
10 Id. § 5(b).
02 Id. § 4. "Site" is the language.of the Act.
103 Id. § 21.
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of the area.' 4 The Act provided for the protection of such sites on private
land 05 subject to consideration of objections to such declarations 0 6 and to
compensation for compulsory State acquisition of land. 10 7  Compulsory
acquisition occurred by operation of the statute, vesting in the Museum on behalf
of the Crown "the exclusive right of occupation and use of. .. every protected
area .... ,108 The Act also provided that the Museum could covenant with
people with an interest in land on which a site was located. Such covenants were
in favour of the Museum and imposed conditions on the use of the land, and
could be either permanent or for a specified time.' 09 The covenant could be dealt
with in the same manner as other covenants under the Transfer of Land Act 1893
(W. Austl.)."10 The provisions providing for compulsory acquisition and dealing
in covenants suggest an emergence of the "property" aspects of the regime
absent from the legislation protecting objects. However, these "property"
provisions did not involve Indigenous people. The Act did not provide for
Indigenous involvement in decision-making about whether or not a site was
"significant"; such determinations were left to the Trustees of the Museum." 1'
The Act established a process for allowing work to be undertaken that
would be deleterious to a site if competing interests were sufficient. 1 2 The
decision allowing injury to a site was largely in the hands of the Trustees of the
Museum. One of the few amendments to the Act altered this process by
significantly increasing the power of the Minister in the decision-making process
and by providing for appeal to the Supreme Court by the owner of land on which
the work is proposed." 13
14 Id. § 23.
105 Id. § 18.
'06 Id. § 18.
107 Id. § 22(2).
'08 Id. § 22(1).
109 Id. § 27(1).
10 Id. § 27(3).
I1 Id. § 18.
112 Id. § 18.
13 Aboriginal Heritage Act, 1980, § 6 (W. Austl.). The Minister was empowered to direct the
Trustees in the exercise of their discretion and to make the final decision in relation to interference with a
site. Michael Dillon, A Terrible Hiding . . . Western Australia's Aboriginal Heritage Policy, 42
AUSTRALIAN J. OF PuB ADMIN. 486 (1983); STEvE HAWKE & MiCHAEL GALLAGHER, NOONKAN3AH 314
(1989) (referring to the events that led to these amendments and their use in the Noonkanbah dispute).
The need for further amendments has been acknowledged by successive Western Australian Governments.
The most recent review was conducted by Dr. Clive Senior in 1995. Amendments in the Aboriginal
Heritage Amendment Act, 1995 (W. Austl.) made only minor amendments to the Act. The fragility of the
right granted is evidenced by the Aboriginal Heritage (Marandoo) Act, 1992 under which the Marandoo
nickel project was removed from the impact of the provisions of the Aboriginal Heritage Act, 1972.
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The South Australian Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (S. Austl.)
represented a significant change in the approach to protecting heritage. The Act
allowed Indigenous people to determine what constitutes heritage 14 and to
manage and control protection efforts." 5 It did not, however, change the
ultimate power of the Minister to authorize the damage or destruction of a site."
6
The Commonwealth passed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Heritage Protection Act (Cth.) in 1984." 7 The Act did not seek to establish a
regime for identifying and protecting sites, but only to prevent damage to sites
when State legislation was ineffective in providing protection. The Act was
intended to operate concurrently with State legislation and to be used as a last
resort." 8 To invoke the Act, a site was required to be in "serious and immediate
threat of injury or desecration ... ,l 19 The Act included reference to land and
land relationships in the range of things it aims to protect. A declaration, either
emergency or otherwise, may be made when a "significant Aboriginal area" is
threatened. 120 A "significant Aboriginal area" is, among other things, defined as
"an area of land in Australia ...of particular significance to Aboriginals in
accordance with Aboriginal tradition.'' "Aboriginal tradition" is further
defined as "a body of traditions, observances, customs and beliefs of Aboriginals
generally or of a particular community or group of Aboriginals, and includes any
"4 Aboriginal Heritage Act, 1988, § 3 (S. Austl.) defines Aboriginal tradition as "traditions,
observances, customs or beliefs of the people who inhabited Australia before European colonization and
includes traditions, observances, customs and beliefs that have evolved or developed from that tradition
since European colonization."
" Id. §§ 7, 8, established an Aboriginal Heritage Committee consisting of Aboriginal people. The
Committee has power to identify and protect heritage in accordance with the Act.
16 It was this power that became the subject of scrutiny in the Kumarangk (or Hindmarsh Island Bridge)
case. This case has dominated debate about Aboriginal heritage legislation during the past four years. It arose
from a proposal to build a bridge between an island and mainland Australia as part of a tourist development. A
group of local Indigenous people, the Narrndjeri, objected on the basis that the bridge interfered with or
destroyed an element of heritage based upon cosmological beliefs of Narrindjeri women. The Commonwealth
Minister exercised his powers under the Aboriginal and Tores Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984
(Austl.) to prevent the bridge from being built. The controversy led to the establishment of an Inquiry into the
operation of the Act. A parliamentary committee is now holding hearings on the report of the Inquiry. There
have been two inquiries under the Act, a Royal Commission into the beliefs upon which the area was claimed to
be heritage, two Supreme Court of South Australia actions, two Federal Court, one High Court case, and a
special Act of Parliament passed. Leave was granted on September 2, 1997 to challenge the validity of the
legislation before the full bench of the High Court. The Court upheld the validity of the legislation in Kartinyeri
v. The Commonwealth (1998) 152 A.L.R1 540.
"17 The history and operation of this and other Commonwealth legislation directed at protecting a range of
Indigenous cultural heritage is discussed in Graeme Neate, Power, Policy, Politics and Persuasion-Protecting
Aboriginal Heritage Under Federal Laws, 6 ENVIRONMENTAL& PLANNING LAW JoURNAL214 (1989).
'1 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984, § 7 (Austi.).
119 Id. § 9(1)(b)(ii).
120 Id. §§ 9, 10.
121 Id § 3.
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such traditions, observances, customs or beliefs relating to particular persons,
areas, objects or relationships."'
22
Together these definitions establish a link between land and Indigenous
traditions. The nature of the interest protected is not just based on historical or
archaeological significance, but on tangible and intangible Indigenous
relationships with particular land. The form of those relationships is limited to
their Indigenous source and the requirement that they be of "particular
significance." Otherwise, there is a degree of freedom in how the relationships
might be characterized and explained.
Whether protection should be accorded a site under the Act is a matter of
Ministerial discretion. Some requirements and obligations are imposed on the
Minister in the exercise of discretion, including consideration of a report by a
person appointed by the Minister. 123 The Act only creates a right to apply to the
Minister for an emergency 124 or other declarations, 12 and to have the application
dealt with in accordance with the Act. The existence of a relationship to land of
the sort set out in the Act is in the nature of a threshold test, providing the
Minister with guidance in the exercise of her or his discretion.126  The right
created under the Act is not a property right, nor does it create any property
rights either at common law or arising from the statute. The extent of the right
created is to have an application dealt with according to the rules of natural
justice. The existence of the relationship does not guarantee that Indigenous
interests in the land will be protected. Cultural heritage legislation has tended to
provide little protection. It is subject to Ministerial discretion, and therefore
political decision making has taken a narrow view of what might be considered
heritage and how it might best be protected.
These statutory schemes recognize the importance of Indigenous heritage
as part of living contemporary cultures. Experience with the statutes reveals an
ambivalence about what is to be protected, why it is worthy of such protection,
and what interests will be dominant in Ministerial decision-making. The
disregard of property rights in the disposition of land interests is a major problem
122 Id.
123 Id. § 10. The Minister must consider the report which must deal with certain matters set out in section
10(4) of the Act. These include "the significance of the area to Aboriginal people..., the nature and extent of
the threat of the injury ... ," and "the effects the making of the declaration may have on the proprietary or
pecuniary interests of persons other than the Aboriginals .... " These are in the nature of procedural
requirements which go to the issue of how the decision is made under the Act and the proprietary interests of
others, rather than the substance of the interest protected by the decision. These require compliance and any
decisions may be reviewed under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Decisions) Act, 1977 (Austl.).
124 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Heritage Protection Act, 1984, § 9 (Austl.).
125 Id. § 10.
126 Tickner v. Bropho (1993) 114 A.L.R. 409, at 419 per Black J.
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with the heritage protection schemes because of the limited enforceable rights
that accrue to Indigenous people under the scheme.
The Kumarangk case is an example of the difficulties experienced in
actually establishing the significance of a particular area according to Indigenous
laws and customs and having that area protected.
127
The Evatt Inquiry was established in response to the difficulties
experienced in the Kumarangk case. The Inquiry's Report recommended that
the procedure for determining heritage significance be a matter for Indigenous
people,' 28 and the procedures for its protection be improved through more
transparent and accessible decision-making,129 better coordination of the State
and Commonwealth systems and agencies, 130 with an emphasis on mediation and
agreements.' 31 However, the Inquiry also recommended that decision-making
remain in the political domain and that the status of heritage remain
unchanged. 132 The extent to which any or all of these recommendations will be
implemented awaits the outcome of a Parliamentary Committee Inquiry into both
the current Commonwealth legislation and the Report. However, the passage of
special legislation, requiring the suspension of the operation of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.) in order to allow the Hindmarsh Island Bridge to
be built,133 suggests a view that will reinforce the diminishing significance of
heritage.
Nonetheless, the legislation provides protection of heritage for many
Indigenous people without access to statutory land rights regimes and has been
the basis for entering into agreements with resource explorers and developers for
the protection of heritage. 134 The changing legal landscape that has given rise to
the recognition of native title has provided the promise of a property based
system of protection for Indigenous land interests absent from heritage schemes.
Heritage protection schemes remain in place and continue to operate in
conjunction with native title and more importantly, remain the only tool for legal
protection of heritage on land where no native title exists.
127 Supra note 116.
128 E. EVATT, REVIEW OF THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER HERITAGE PROTECTION
ACT 198, Cl. 8 (1996).
129 Id. cth 10.
130 Id. CL 5.
131 Id. Ci. 9.
132 Id. clL 10.
133 The constitutional validity of the legislation was challenged but upheld. Katinyeri v. The
Commonwealth (1998) 152 A.L.R. 540.
134 Tehan, supra note 70.
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V. NATIvE TITLE JURISPRUDENCE AND POST-MABO LEGISLATION
A. Mabo v. Queensland: Judicial Recognition of Native Title
In Mabo II, the High Court found that some Indigenous rights over land
survived after Britain acquired sovereignty over Australia in 1788.35 The
term "native title" was used by the Court to describe those rights and interests
which derive from the traditions, laws, and customs of Indigenous people.
The traditions, laws, and customs must have been practiced prior to
sovereignty, must continue today, and must not have been extinguished by the
Crown. The interest is not a common law tenure, but is a sui generis interest
recognized by the common law. Although the Court found that native title
existed, many of the details of the form and impact of the interest were not
decided by the Court.
The decision signaled a new era in the relationship between Indigenous
people and the settler legal system. It acknowledged inherent, surviving
Indigenous property rights, based upon traditional and continuing connections
with land. The recognition of Indigenous property interests has challenged
the dominant property paradigm under which no Indigenous interests were
recognized and any interests claimed were always subjugated to the dominant
settler interests. Recognition of native title has produced a new set of
conflicting land uses and interests in public and in limited circumstances,
private land. Although Indigenous land interests existed in some form under
statutory Indigenous land rights schemes, they were given new impetus with
the extension of native title to large areas of the Australian land mass. Here
was a new interest arising out of Indigenous people's relationship to land
previously unknown to the common law.
The Mabo II decision had two major elements: recognition of native
title and development of the detail of its form and content. It overturned the
notion that the Australian continent was terra nullius. While the Court
acknowledged that it might be overturning significant law on this issue, 3 6 it
nevertheless considered that "whatever the justification advanced in earlier
days for refusing to recognize the rights and interests in land of the
Indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory
doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted.' '137 Rejection of terra
135 MaboIM(1992) 175 C.L.R 1.
136 Mabo 11 at 20 per Brennan J.
131 Mabo II at 31.
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nullius was considered necessary for the court to allow the survival of
Indigenous rights and interests which existed at the time sovereignty was
acquired. 1
38
The Court reassessed the significance of the acquisition of sovereignty
to the Crown's power to make grants of land. It made a distinction between
the Crown's radical title incorporating this power and the notion of the Crown
as the holder of absolute beneficial title to all the land. In this way, it became
doctrinally possible for pre-existing land interests to be said to have survived
the acquisition of sovereignty and to overcome the earlier cases.
139
Unraveling the meaning and import of this distinction for the land
management and property law system then became the project for subsequent
decisions. 1
40
The Court considered the form of native title and how it could affect
current land uses and management laws and practices. The detail of this
recognition of rights, including the form and effect of the interest, that is
native title 141 directly impacts shared land use and management law and
practice. 1
42
The Court said that native title derives from the traditional laws and
customs of an identifiable group which establish a connection between that
group and specific land. The connection with the land must have existed
prior to the acquisition of sovereignty and have been maintained until the
present. The connection may relate to economic, cultural, or religious or
spiritual life on the land, and must be more than random or coincidental. The
group must continue to acknowledge laws, practice customs, and identify as a
community. 143 The nature or incidents of native title and the way in which the
138 The extent to which such an overturning of previous authority was necessary and the doctrinal
basis of the Court's recharacterisation of Australia's colonization have both been questioned. See
Nettheim, supra note 52; Gerry Simpson, Mabo, International Law Terra Nullius and the Stories of
Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence, 19 MELBOURNE U. L REv. 195 (1993); David Ritter, The
"Rejection Of Terra Nullius" in Mabo, IS SYDNEY L. REv. 5 (1996).
139 This view is also at the heart of Wik Gummow J refers to this as the constitutional basis of the
Mabo decision. Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 at 227-30.
'40 Reviewing the meaning of land tenures under the settler legal system in light of this view was
central to the decisions of the majority in Wik and the reconfiguration of the relationship with those
surviving rights and the settler system particularly on the issue of extinguishment and coexistence.
14' Mabo 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
142 Although the Court did not explore this issue further in its judgment Edgeworth has suggested
that such a narrow view of the common law property system was always inappropriate in the Australian
context and in fact, this view was largely confirmed by the High Court in Wik. See Brendan Edgeworth,
Tenure, Allodialism and Indigenous Rights at Common Law: English, United States and Australian Land
Law Compared after Mabo v. Queensland, 23 ANGLO-AM L 1. 397 (1994).
143 Mabo H at 50-51.
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land is used and occupied will vary from group to group and will depend
upon the laws and customs of that group. The complexity of the interest, so
characterized, is readily apparent, and carries with it substantial requirements
in adequately defining the laws, customs, and group, as well as the continuing
nature of those laws and customs. The absence of a substantial body of law
that refines and provides guidance on each of these points, as well as the
unique nature of each group's laws, customs and contact history, readily
suggests both the complexity and time required for the conduct of native title
litigation. 144
Deciphering the relationship between native title and the range of
common law or statutory interests in land created or granted since the
acquisition of sovereignty was a significant part of the Court's excursion into
native title. The central element in this relationship was whether or not the
granting of common law and statutory interests had the effect of extinguishing
native title. This issue has come to dominate both the political and judicial
landscape. 1
45
In Mabo II, the Court held that even if native title survived the
acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown, it could be extinguished by the
lawful operation of the municipal laws of the state, provided the intent to
extinguish title was clear. 146  Once extinguished, whether by legislation,
executive order, surrender, abandonment, or death, at least one judge held
that the title could not be revived. 147 Native title is extinguished only to the
extent legislation or land grants pursuant to legislation are inconsistent with
Indigenous interests. Grants in fee, for example, extinguish native title; limits
on activities on nature conservation reserves, however, do not. Native title is
preserved whenever Indigenous rights can co-exist with other land rights.
The Mabo H decision alluded to the difficulty in determining the relationship
144 There have only been three determinations of native title to date. Two were by consent. Only
one final and contested determination has yet been made although there are now a number of cases
proceeding. See Mary Yarmirr v. Northern Territory (Fed. Ct. of Aust., Olney, July 6, 1998, unreported).
14- See, e.g., Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129; Mason v. Tritton (1994) 34 N.S.W.L.R. 572; see also:
Lenore Taylor & Paul Syvret, Industry Dismayed by Wik Ruling, THE AusTRALIAN FIN. REv., Dec. 24,
1996, at 1; Alan Moran, Wik Decision Settles Nothing for Miners, THE AUSTRAuAN, Dec. 24, 1996, at 13;
Denis Burke, Judgment Adds to Delay and Expense, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 7, 1997, at 11; Lenore Taylor
It's true-a Wik is a Long Time in Politics, THE AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Jan. 24, 1997, at 33.
146 In order to extinguish "the exercise of a power to extinguish native title must reveal a clear and
plain intention to do so, whether the action be taken by the Legislature or by the Executive." Mabo H
(1992) 175 C.L.R 1, at 64 per Brennan J.
Three other majority judges agreed that native title could be extinguished by the lawful exercise of
sovereign power under the constitution and laws of the State provided that the language extinguishing
title was clear and plain. Id. at 110 per Deane and Gaudron JJ; and at 196 per Toohey J.
147 Id. at 60 per Brennan J. Note that this proposition was challenged in Wik.
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between potentially inconsistent acts and extinguishment. The precise
parameters of these propositions remained unclear in the decision. Wik in
particular has refined and added meaning to some elements of the doctrine
and further blurred others.14
8
The Mabo H decision acknowledged that the Racial Discrimination Act
1975 (Cth.) limits the sovereign power to extinguish native title. 14 9 Under the
Act, the Crown in right of the States can not purport to extinguish native title
in a manner that treats a native title holder less favourably than the holder of
another property interest. Both the Mabo I decision and a subsequent High
Court decision on the validity of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth.) confirm that
the interest is akin to a property interest, at least for ,the purposes of the
Racial Discrimination Act. 150 This characterization of the native title interest,
or at least its protection from extinguishment by racially discriminatory acts,
has been a crucial factor in determining the power of the various interests in
negotiating native title issues.
In understanding the impact of Mabo 11, it is essential to understand
that, though the Court confirmed that native title survived colonization, the
details of the form, substance, and significance of native title were not
necessary to the Court's holding. Its comments upon these aspects, however,
were seen as significant in providing guidance about the impact of its primary
decision. As a result of Mabo II, there was uncertainty about the validity and
effect of prior Crown grants of interests in land that may have been subject to
native title at the time the grant was made and the breadth and content of
native title itself. This uncertainty was addressed in the Native Title Act and
in subsequent cases."'
B. The Native Title Act
In response to the uncertainty created by Mabo I1, the Australian
legislature passed the Native Title Act. The Act confirms the existence of
native title as part of the law of Australia and defines the nature of native title
that draws largely upon the general statements in Mabo JJ.152 It confirms that
148 Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129.
14 Mabo H at 67 per Brennan J, 119 per Deane and Gaudron JJ, 214-216 per Toohey J. The Racial
Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.) represented the domestic implementation of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Act had previously been upheld as a valid exercise
of Commonwealth power and one which bound the States. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168.
o Mabo 1 (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186; Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373.
51 Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129.
152 Mabo H (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; Native Title Act, 1993, § 223 (Austl.).
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native title is a compensable property interest 153 and describes how native
title claims can be established. 154 The Act also confirmed the validity of all
titles and interests granted prior to the Act's 1 January 1994 effective date. It
prescribed the effect of the validation of those grants on native title and
provided a system which detailed a code for future dealing with native title
land by governments and industry. It detailed a compensation regime for
native title that had been extinguished by prior land grants or that might be
extinguished in the future. The National Native Title Tribunal was
established to process and mediate native title claims and to process and
mediate applications and objections to future acts on native title land. The
legislation passed after months of tortuous negotiation between the key stake
holders, including State governments, resource development and farming
industry groups, non-government environmental organizations, and
Indigenous people. While no group was completely satisfied with the
outcome and many groups, including the Indigenous groups, were not in
complete agreement among themselves, the outcome represented a
compromise with which most groups appeared satisfied. 55
The Act seeks to legislatively implement the effect of the Mabo II
decision, but in some circumstances, it goes beyond the case itself.156
However, it provides no guidance or clarity on the matters that the Court left
unanswered and that now require clarification by the Courts in subsequent
cases, such as the nature or extent of "connection" and "continuity."
1. Past Land Grants
The Native Title Act validated prior land grants that were invalid
because of the existence of native title, probably because of a breach of the
Racial Discrimination Act. 157 The effect of that validation depended upon the
nature of the grant. The validation of a fee simple grant, and certain other
grants, had the effect of extinguishing native title and compensation could be
claimed. 158  The validation of grants of mining interests did not have the
effect of extinguishing native title. Rather, native title was subject to the
153 For example in relation to compulsory acquisitions of native title. Native Title Act, 1993, §§
23(3), 253 (Austi.).
154 Western Australia v. The Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373 at 453.
155 Rowse, supra note 8. '
156 For example, the Act specifically provides in § 223(l)(b) that native title includes water claims.
Native Title Act, 1993, § 223(1)(b) (Austl.).
117 Validly granted interests were unaffected by the Act.
15 Native Title Act, 1993, §§ 15(1), 229 (Austl.).
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exercise of any rights granted under the mining tenement and in effect was
"suspended" until termination of the mining tenement. Upon termination of
the mining interest, all native title interests in the land may be resumed.'5 9
The validation of other acts, such as Crown reservations for environmental
and conservation purposes, did not extinguish native title, but allowed
concurrent enjoyment to the extent possible.'
60
2. Future Grants
Where native title exists or may exist, a State must comply with the
procedures in the Act whenever it grants land interests to third parties.
Failure to comply will render the grant invalid. 161 The procedure requires that
notice be given to a native title party, that is, a person who may have native
title or who has claimed native title. If the native title party objects to the
proposed grant, negotiation between the native title party, government, and
third party ensues. 162  If negotiation is unsuccessful, arbitration ensues.
163
The Minister may override the decision of the arbitrator in the interest of the
State or Commonwealth. 164 This process must be completed within sixteen
months of notice being given in the case of a proposed grant of a mining
tenement for production, or within fourteen months of the notice being given
in the case of an exploration tenement. 165 The purpose of the process is to
determine whether the proposed grant should be made and if so, on what
conditions. 1
66
The procedure for land grants operates concurrently with the process
for determining whether native title exists in land. Many claims for native
title are in fact lodged (as they are required to be)167 in response to the
notification of a proposed grant of an interest on native title land and in order
to preserve native title rights. Parties can mediate the issue of whether native
title exists, but such a procedure is rare. 168 Typically, claims are referred to
159 Id. §. 15(l)(d). See also §§ 17, 238 (discussing the non-extinguishment principle).
160 id.
161 Id. §.22. The effect of this provision was confirmed in Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995)
183 C.L.R 373.
16' Native Title Act, 1993, §§ 26-31 (Austl.).
163 Id. §§ 35-39.
164 Id §42.
165 These figures are a combination of all the time limits at each stage of the process.
166 Native Title Act, 1993, §§ 38, 39 (Austl.).
167 Id. § 30.
168 Only two mediated determinations of native title have occurred. One mediated determination
was a consent determination between native title holders and the New South Wales government in
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the Federal Court for determination. 169 The first of these referred cases is
only now being heard. 170 Although the two processes operate concurrently, it
is not necessary to determine whether native title exists prior to the
procedure.
C. The Impact of Wik
Access to the processes and remedies of the Native Title Act is
dependent upon claiming or establishing native title. Determining whether
native title has been extinguished is the crucial factor in determining the
rights, interests, and obligations of the various parties under the Act. It is for
this reason that Wik 17 1 was so crucial. Wik took up and began to explore
some of the doctrinal bases of the judgments in Mabo 11,172 as well as some of
the Court's general comments in relation to extinguishment. In arriving at its
decision, the Court addressed a number of issues that are central to the
property law regime in Australia. These included the nature of the Crown's
power to grant land, as well as the relationship between English common law
property principles and the specific regimes for granting interests in land, first
within the Australian colonies and subsequently the States and the
Commonwealth.
Wik involved the grant of a number of pastoral leases in far north
Queensland between 1910 and 1974. The central issue was whether these
grants extinguished native title. There were four separate majority opinions
delivered, and one minority opinion which had the support of three judges.
While the opinions are complex, the issue basically revolved around the
characterization of the interest granted-was it a common law lease granting
exclusive possession or was it some form of statutory grant?
The four judges in the majority found that the grant of pastoral leases
was authorized by statute. The effect of the statute and the instrument
granting the interest, according to the court's interpretation, was a specific
relation to a an exchange of land for native title to a national park. For details of the agreement see The Crescent
HeadAgreement, 2 AUMSTRlIAN INDIGENOUSL REP. 100 (1997).
169 Native Title Act, 1993, § 81 (Austl.).
170 The pre-trial procedures can occupy more than a year and it is not uncommon that interlocutory
matters or substantive questions of law are referred for determination by Appeal Courts. Hearings can last for
many months. Seventeen cases had been referred to the Federal Court by August 1997.
The Yorta Yorta claim began in 1994. The Federal Court hearing began in October 1996 and the taling of
evidence is not expected to be completed before October 1997.
172 Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129.172 Mabo H (1992) 175 C.L.R.I1.
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statutory interest and the interpretation of the statute indicated that it was not
a grant of exclusive possession to the lease holder. 173 A crucial aspect of the
majority's view was that the Crown held only radical title to the land rather
than the full beneficial title. As a result, as not full beneficial title existed, it
was possible for native title to co-exist with this statutory interest. In the
postscript to the judgment of Toohey J, all the judges constituting the majority
agreed that if there was a conflict, the native title holders must yield to the
rights of the leaseholder. However, the majority did not say what the effect
of such inconsistency was, or that the native title rights in this instance were
extinguished. Accordingly, the precise legal effect of this conflict on the
extinguishment of native title is unclear. 1
74
One major effect of the decision has been to require a re-examination
of the applicability of English common law principles in the Australian
property law regime. 175 The second major impact has been the illustration of
the difficulty in attributing meaning to the general comments of the Court in
Mabo H.176 Both the majority and the minority took up aspects of the
reasoning, but applied them to the case in different ways, producing very
different outcomes. Indeed, Toohey J was very clear about the limits of
Mabo 1. Discussing the comments of Brennan J on extinguishment by
leasehold, his Honour said "At their highest, the references are obiter."17
The difficulty in predicting outcomes of future cases is well exemplified.
As a result of Wik, native title persisted on pastoral lease land and any
actions taken on pastoral lease land since the Native Title Act came into
effect must have been done in accordance with that legislation, otherwise,
they would be invalid. This raised questions about the validity of resource
tenements and government reservations of land made on any pastoral lease
land since the Act came into effect. In addition, questions arose about the
boundaries of rights, duties, and obligations of pastoralists under their grants
173 Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R 129, at 181 per Toohey J.
174 The factual issues about the precise detail of the laws and customs of the group claiming native
title and the extent of the rights of each party was referred back to the Federal Court for determination.
The lack of clarity raises the possibility that native title is "suspended" in this instance. Such a view may
not be consistent with that expressed in Mabo I] that once extinguished native title could not be revived.
The minority took the view that the rights granted under statute amounted to common law lease
rights. An integral aspect of the exercise of the Crown's power was the doctrine of plenum dominium,
that is, upon the exercise of its powers to grant a lease, a reversion in the Crown came into effect. At this
point, the Crown acquired absolute beneficial title and therefore it was not possible for native title to
persist. Wik at 156 per Brennan J.
175 1d. at 226 per Gummow J.
'7' Mabo11(1992) 175 C.L.R- 1.
'7 Wik at 183.
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of pastoral leases. Furious public debate 178 on these issues led to the
introduction of amendments to the Native Title Act to "clarify" aspects of its
operation in relation to shared uses.
D. Native Title Act Amendments
A number of amendments to the Native Title Act were proposed in 1995
and further amendments were proposed when a new federal government was
elected in 1996. The former involved mainly procedural matters while the latter
included a complex test for access to the right to negotiate procedures, as well as
a bundle of amendments recognizing and allowing for the enforcement of a range
of negotiated agreements. 179  The proposed amendments in reaction to Wik
include provisions removing the right to negotiate from pastoral lease land,
requiring a specific and contemporary physical presence on pastoral lease land in
order to permit "traditional" use of the land, increasing the rights of grantees
under pastoral leases to engage in a range of activities that are not currently
permitted by their leases, and allowing States to extinguish native title all together
provided that they pay compensation.
The effect of these proposals are far reaching. First, they remove the
impetus for negotiation with native title holders and thus significantly diminish
the "value" of native title and the possibilities for joint use and management.
Second, by requiring a specific physical connection with land, the legislation is
both prescribing and limiting elements of traditional laws and customs that are at
the heart of native title. The imposition of this limiting element suggests a return
to dominance of the settler legal system at the expense of Indigenous land
relationships. Third, the unilateral increase in the rights of pastoral lessees will
have a significant uncontrolled and negative impact on environmental
management of sensitive arid and semi-arid environments. It also diminishes the
extent to which native title might be concurrently enjoyed with pastoral activities
by valuing the settler land use and interests above those of native title holders.
Finally, allowing extinguishment significantly reasserts the dominance of the
settler system at a time when the balance had been shifted, representing a
reversion to pre-Mabo II practices.' 
80
178 Supra note 145.
179 This was designed to overcome any problems associated with the lack of such provisions that
meant that parties must currently rely on contract to enforce their agreements.
1go The Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Austl.) was passed in July and became law on September 30,
1998. The broad outline of the Amendments do not vary substantially from the matters referred to here.
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VI. RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND
NATIVE TITLE
The notion of coexistent rights and concurrent enjoyment of land by
native title holders and other users, while not new to the common law,181 has
created a new and challenging dimension to land management in most areas
in Australia. Two major and identifiable responses to this challenge can be
discerned in the post-Mabo H era. The first has been litigation and reliance
on the strict legal entitlements established within the Native Title Act; the
second has been innovative agreements, not strictly relying upon the Native
Title Act although significantly underpinned by its existence.
A. The Litigation Approach
The litigation approach is characterized by a strict reliance upon rights
set out in the Native Title Act or at common law and a willingness to enforce
those rights in the courts. The clearest illustration of this approach involved
an application by Century Zinc Ltd. for required mining licenses and leases
from the Queensland government to establish a mine to recover a proven and
substantial zinc deposit in the Gulf country of northern Australia.
In 1994, prior to the tenements being granted, a native title claim was
lodged on behalf of the Waanyi people to the land covered by the proposed
mine. The land had been the subject of a grant of a pastoral lease in 1883,
but the lease had never been taken up by the lessor and was ultimately
forfeited. The Waanyi had occupied the land before and since that time in
accordance with their tradition. The President of the National Native Title
Tribunal determined that native title had been extinguished by the grant of the
pastoral lease and refused to accept the application. The Waanyi appealed
the decision to the Federal Court' 82 and then to the High Court.183 The High
Court limited its ruling to procedural issues, dealing with the powers of the
President of the National Native Title Tribunal under the relevant provisions
of the Native Title Act. The effect of the decision was that the Tribunal was
required to accept the application and the various time limits in the Native
Title Act (a maximum of sixteen months in this case) began to run.'
s4
181 MAUREEN TEHAN, COEXISTENCE OF INTERESTS IN LAND: A DOMINANT FEATURE OF THE COMMON
LAW (1997).
182 North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v. Queensland (1995) 132 A.L.R. 565.
18 North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v. Queensland (1996) 135 A.L.R. 225.
184 North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v. Queensland (1996) 135 A.L.R. 225.
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The parties were in precisely the same position they would have been if
the application had been accepted and processed in June 1994, though they
were now required to negotiate with each other in the context of three years
of animosity and argument. The case was complex as the project involved
both the mine area and areas of land for pipelines covering hundreds of
kilometres. There were fourteen Indigenous groups involved in the process.
Ultimately, the process ran its course, proceeding to arbitration, although a
final agreement was reached prior to the arbitrator making a finding. This
approach effectively delayed the process for two and half years. The impact
of the approach on the on-going relationship between the parties will only
emerge over time.
While Century Zinc is an extreme case, it is illustrative of the problems
associated with formal legal processes. In contrast, the agreements approach
suggests both quicker and mutually beneficial outcomes for all parties.
B. The Agreements Approach
Both the range of issues covered by agreements and the circumstances
in which they have been negotiated vary enormously. However, it is the
existence or possible existence of native title and the rights and interests that
might involve that has underpinned all of the agreements. While some
agreements have emerged directly from the processes of the Native Title Act,
others have been negotiated outside the Act. Concurrent with the
development of negotiated agreements has been the changing corporate
cultures of resource developers' 85 and a concomitant change in the approach
of at least some Indigenous groups to development.
86
Native title claims are the impetus for negotiation of agreements. The
Native Title Act facilitates the negotiation of agreements, either because they
can be entered into under § 21(4) or might emerge as a result of mediation
under §§ 31 or 72 of the Act. Claims do not necessarily lead to an agreement or
'83 RicHIE Howrrr, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TABLE: CORPORATE CULTURE AND NEGOTIATING WITH
RESOURCE COMPANIES (1997).
186 Each agreement is different in significant ways but each represents possibilities for the resoluion of
competing land uses and interests For example, the Jawoyn recently launched a comprehensive mining policy
which sets out the group's approach to exploration and mining as well as details of prospective land available for
exploration signaling an active approach to resource development on their land: Maria Ceresa, Jawoyn Launch
First TribalMining Policy, TIM AUMAUAN ONLNE: DAILY NEWS, Sept 25, 1997.
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even to negotiation. 187 The Act does not prescribe negotiation nor does it
include any enforcement provisions for such agreements.'
88
Many agreements have been achieved to date. Six of those, which
revolve around competing uses of, or access to, resources, will be
examined. 189  The six fall into two identifiable categories. The first is
framework agreements that provide a decision making process to resolve
disputes concerning land use planning and accommodation of different land
uses and interests. The second category is project or site specific agreements
that detail how land is actually to be used, the ways in which native title land
interests will be protected, and the benefits to flow to the native title holders.
The earliest agreement was the Cape York heads of agreement, while
others include the Rubibi Working Group's interim agreement in relation to
town planning in Broome, the Mount Todd Agreement, the Anaconda
Agreement, the Pilbara agreement and the Gawler-Craton agreement. 90
The first agreement was negotiated between Cape York Land Council,
the Cattlemen's Union, and Conservation groups in the region and provides a
framework for future resource decision making. As part of the agreement
Indigenous groups agreed to exercise their rights in a manner that did "not
interfere with the rights of pastoralists" and the pastoralists agreed to
"continuing rights of access for traditional owners to pastoral properties for
traditional purposes."' 191  The agreement also dealt with regimes for
identifying areas of high conservation values and World Heritage listing of
Cape York. 192  The agreement does not involve either an acknowledgment
that native title exists or a surrender of native title interests. The agreement
was reached outside of any formal native title negotiation and without the
187 The Western Australian government has been found not to have negotiated in good faith in
relation to future act proceedings under § 31(l)(b) of the Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.). See Walley v.
Western Australia (1996) 137 A.L.R 561.
... Native Title Amendment Bill, 1997, §§ 24BA-24EC.
189 For example, the Mount Todd agreement between the Jawoyn Association, the Northern
Territory Government and Zapopan NL in relation to a mining project; the Broome Tropical Aquaculture
Park Management Agreement between the Western Australian Minister for Fisheries and the Rubibi
Aboriginal Land, Heritage and Development Company Pty. Ltd in relation to an aquaculture area near
Broome; the Anaconda agreement between Anaconda Nickel and the Walijen in relation to the
development of a nickel project in the goldfields region of Western Australia; the Hopevale agreement
between a number of Indigenous groups in the Hopevale area setting out the basis upon which they will
jointly advance their native title interests.
190 The detail of these agreements are generally subject to confidentiality clauses. The information
included here is all available publicly.
191 1 INDIGENOUS L. REP. 446, at 447 (1996).
192 Id. at 447-48.
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involvement of the Native Title Tribunal.' 93 The central feature of the
agreement was the creation of a framework for the resolution of disputes. To
date, the Queensland government has not indicated any willingness to endorse
and become a party to the agreement and the Commonwealth government has
indicated it may withdraw its support, thus creating doubt about the long term
effectiveness of the agreement.
The Broome agreement involves an acknowledgment that Indigenous
people have an interest in land use and management which might be achieved
by ensuring Indigenous participation in planning and that Indigenous interests
are a legitimate part of the planning process. The agreement includes the
possibility of joint management of resources particularly in relation to coastal
management.194 Neither the recognition, nor the surrender of native title, was
part of the agreement. The native title claim is proceeding. The agreement
was reached as part of the mediation process of the native title claim and the
Native Title Tribunal was involved in the mediation, 19 although its
involvement has been criticized 19 6 as "a process which is highly culturally
intimidating, where there is considerable duress to participate, in which the
parties meet unequally, and in which those inequities can be institutionalized
by the process."' 97 This form of agreement has considerable potential for the
resolution of urban planning disputes as it enables a wide range of interests to
be incorporated into the decision-making process. Rather than recognizing
Indigenous interests as marginal or separate, there is an acknowledgment of
the relevance and even centrality of those interests to any shared land use
regime.
The Mount Todd agreement was reached prior to passage of the Native
Title Act, but after the Mabo II decision. Under the agreement between the
Jawoyn Association, the Northern Territory Government, and Zapopan NL,
the Jawoyn agreed not to proceed with a native title claim, to surrender its
native title rights, and to allow the Mount Todd mine of a proved gold deposit
to proceed. In return, it received a grant of freehold title over a smaller area
of land from the Northern Territory government and Zapopan NL agreed to a
range of payments, employment and commercial preferences, education and
193 Rick Farley, who later became a member of the Tribunal, was involved in facilitaing the negotiations.
194 1 INDIGENOUS L. REP. 464, at 465 (1996).
195 Id.
196 S. JACKSON, WHEN HISTORY MEETS THE NEW NATIVE TITLE ERA AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE 36-
44 (1996); P. Sullivan Problems of Mediation in the Native Title Tribunal, in ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE
NATIVE TITLE ERA 97 (J. Fingleton & J. Finlayson eds., 1995).
'9' See Sullivan, supra note 196.
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training programmes, and other economic benefits for the Jawoyn as well as
procedures for cultural and environmental protection.
198
The Anaconda agreement between Anaconda Nickel and the Waljen
covered the development of a $900 million nickel deposit in Western
Australia. The Waljen agreed not to proceed with its native title claim. In
return, Anaconda will establish a foundation into which it will pay annual
amounts and Waljen will be able to access funds through the foundation. 199
The Pilbara agreement is perhaps the most far reaching. The
agreement involved Hamersley Iron (a subsidiary of RTZ-CRA, the same
company involved in the Century Zinc case) and the Gumala Aboriginal
Corporation. The agreement allows for the development of a $500 million
iron ore deposit at the Yandicoogina mine. In return, the Gumala Aboriginal
Corporation will receive compensation of $60 million and a range of other
benefits and cultural and environment protection mechanisms. Native title
remains unaffected and claims will proceed in the usual way. The agreement
was negotiated over fourteen months between Hamersley and the corporation
with the assistance of an experienced mediator. The process required three
different language and cultural groups to come together in a group, resolve
their differences, and then negotiate an outcome. The negotiation took place
outside of the Native Title Act but clearly the potential existence of native
title provided the key to bringing the parties to the table. 00
The Gawler-Craton agreement between Grenfell Resources and a
number of Aboriginal communities in Western and South Australia allows for
a two year exploration programme and includes a process for heritage
protection that satisfies the requirements of both native title and heritage
legislation.20' While there are provisions for payments to communities for
surveying costs associated with heritage protection activities, there are no "up
front" or compensation payments.20 2 Again, under this agreement, the native
title issue has not been determined nor does it operate as an undue limitation
on the exploration activities of the developer. However, the agreement
ensures that any native title is protected or preserved, but does not impede the
commercial activity of a resource developer.
IOS INDIGENOUS L. REP. 445 (1996).
199 Patrick Hosking, Anaconda-Aboriginal Pact, AGE, July 4, 1996, at B1.
200 Richard Sproull, Title Bouts, AUSTRALIAN, April 7, 1997, at 24.
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There is a significant capacity to expand these agreements to include a
broader range of resource projects and environmental and planning matters,
and to increase the capacity of Indigenous people to influence and shape
environmental and resource management.
Comprehensive agreements covering service delivery by governments
and self-government issues have not been reached though they have been
proposed in a number of circumstances.20 3 These agreements would require
input from, and cooperation by, State and Commonwealth governments,
especially for service delivery agreements. The precise nature of these
agreements, 204 the size and geo-political elements 20 5 of the parties, and the
content will all vary according to the interests and concerns of the parties.
Such agreements remain the most significant factor in land use management
that might emerge from the native title process.
The amendments to the Native Title Act facilitate negotiation by
providing for registration and enforcement of agreements. Ironically, the
amendments will also severely limit the circumstances in which negotiations
might occur. For example, the right to negotiate on pastoral lease lands is
abolished.20 6
As indicated in the Broome agreement, native title can provide the
basis for expanding the matters on which Indigenous interests are considered,
and regimes and protocols can be developed that incorporate these interests in
decision making. Each of the agreements referred to above include
substantial environmental elements and assessments in which Indigenous
people are expected to participate. In relation to management of conservation
reserves and resources, there has been a continuation of the patterns
developed pre-Mabo H. At the very least, there has been both a judicial and
203 See, e.g., NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL & KIMBERLEY LAND COUNCIL, NATIVE TITLE, PASTORAL
LEASES AND MODELS FOR Co-EXISTENCE (Jan. 1997); COEXISTENCE NEGOTIATION CERTAINTY:
INDIGENOUS POSITION IN RESPONSE TO THE WIK DECISION (April 1997). Western Australian Premier
Richard Court in relation to the Ngaanyatjarra leased lands in Western Australia. Interestingly the
Premier suggested that the agreement would be negotiated "outside the 'unworkable' federal law."'
However, while the agreement may not use the Native Title Act, there can be no doubt that the recognition
of native title and the procedures enshrined in the Act provide the impetus for such a proposal. WA on
Verge of Land Deal with Aborigines, SUNDAY AGE, Nov. 17, 1996, at 2. The government's initial
response to the decision was to attempt to extinguish all native title: Land (Titles and Traditional Usage)
Act 1993 (WA), struck down in Western Australia v. The Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373.
204 JUSTICE ROBERT FRENCH, LOCAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS (1997); Marcus Lane et al., Land and
Resource Planning under Native Title: Towards an Initial Model, 14 ENvrL & PLAN. L J. 249 (1997).
205 RCHIE HOWETr, THE GEo-POLITICS OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS (1997).
206 By abolishing the right to negotiate on pastoral leases. See supra part V D; Alcan Agreement
"Would Not Be Permitted Under Wik Law, " AAP NEWSFEED, Sept 3, 1997.
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legislative recognition of Indigenous interests in reserves and the preservation
of native title within environmental reserves.207
Agreements inspired by native title claims will usually include heritage
protection measures. The precise nature of these measures will vary from
agreement to agreement and depend to a large extent upon the aspirations of
the Indigenous groups involved. Resource managers will seek to ensure that
they are protected from future disruption through actions under heritage
legislation while Indigenous groups will be anxious to ensure that heritage is
adequately protected within the regimes and protocols negotiated into
agreements. The nature and status of heritage is subsumed by native title.
Encompassed in Native Title are the laws and customs of the group, including
its connection to land and elements of heritage, whether knowledge or
features in the landscape or resources on the land. As a result, native title
provides an all embracing means of addressing Indigenous land and heritage
interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mabo v. Queensland 208 changed the relationship between Indigenous
people and the settler legal system. Mabo II and Wik209 have expanded the
range of rights and interests in land enjoyed by Indigenous people as well as
the geographical coverage of those rights and interests. Legislation has had
an equivocal impact, both expanding and attempting to contract the rights
recognized at common law. The regimes established for the regulation of
native title, including the capacity for negotiated agreements and other land
uses have built on and expanded the experiences of pre-Mabo H land
management arrangements. They have added an edge to the arrangements
derived from the uncertainty created by native title claims. The parameters
and content of these arrangements remain to be fully explored, but represent a
significant change in the model of decision making for land and resource use.
In particular, they have extended the area of land over which Indigenous
interests must be taken into account and have provided the opportunity for
partnerships negotiated between different land users. The recognition of
native title has a central place in this rearrangement of property interests.
2w Native Title Act, §§ 1.5(d), 238, 1993 (Austl.).
208 Mabo 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
209 Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129.
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Paradoxically, with new models for recognition of Indigenous land
interests and the consequent Indigenous involvement in land and resource use
and management, there has been a diminution in the moral and legal
imperative for effective heritage protection. The pre-existing heritage
schemes continue to provide the only protection of Indigenous heritage on
lands on which native title has been extinguished. Legislative heritage
protection is inadequate and the combination of judicial and legislative
approaches is currently producing a diminishing protective regime.
Through a series of judicial and legislative decisions, the right to claim
heritage protection has seemingly been reduced to a simple statutory right to
make an application, with an expectation of some measure of procedural
fairness. The right carries no property interests and, in the absence of native
title, no enforceable rights to protection. The possibilities for heritage
protection regimes that include substantial recognition of Indigenous interests
in land, outside of the native title concept, is remote.
This recognition of native title has seen a privileging of native title land
at the expense of Indigenous heritage on land or in areas where native title
has been extinguished.210 While the development of jurisprudence that
acknowledges some property interest in heritage could bring into play a range
of constitutional and common law protections, the thrust of both the cases and
the debate suggests this is unlikely.
There is a coincidence between the general description of both native
title and heritage. Heritage is based on the relationship of Indigenous people
to land and includes "a body of traditions, observances, customs and beliefs
of Aboriginals."211  The resonance with the judicial and legislative
formulation of native title-"the traditional laws acknowledged by and the
traditional customs observed by the Indigenous inhabitants" 22-are obvious.
However, native title has become the Indigenous form of property rights, not
heritage. No prospective developments challenge this pattern.
210 This argument is developed at length in Maureen Tehan, To Be Or Not To Be (Property): Anglo-
Australian Law and the Search For Protection Of Indigenous Cultural Heritage, 15 U. TASMANIA L. REv.
267 (1996).
211 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984, § 3 (Austl.).
212 Mabo 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, at 58 per Brennan, J. See also Native Title Act, 1993, § 223 (Austl.).
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